The war for legality
Poland is the target of a ‘false flag’ operation
Maciej Świrski
Introduction: A seemingly domestic dispute, but actually an Active Measures operation
In May 2025, constitutionally mandated presidential elections were held in Poland, resulting in Karol Nawrocki being elected president, according to official and valid results. Although the elections were conducted in accordance with procedures, under the full supervision of the National Electoral Commission (Polish acronym: PKW) and without any significant objections from foreign observers, an unexpected and aggressive campaign to delegitimize the results began just a few days after the results were announced. This was, in fact, a continuation of what had already been happening during the election campaign – systematic undermining of the credibility of the process and discrediting of the main opposition candidate.
Immediately after the announcement of the results of the May presidential election, which, let us recall, were conducted in accordance with the law and did not raise any objections from either the PKW or international observers, increasingly loud accusations began to be made by politicians from the ruling coalition, led by the prime minister. The media and public speakers began to talk about a ‘manipulation,’ ‘systemic advantage,’ ‘election fraud,’ and even the ‘lack of a social mandate’ for the winning candidate.
It is hard not to get the impression that this reaction was not spontaneous, but rather a result of disappointment with the outcome. No new evidence emerged, no effective election protests were lodged, and the elections were not challenged in court. Nevertheless, a narrative offensive was launched, the aim of which was not to clarify any irregularities, but something much more serious: to systematically undermine confidence in the election results and in the office of the president, as such. The tone of these statements was not about correction or repair, but about depriving the president, who had been elected in a general election, of his legitimacy. This was a deliberately sustained message, delivered synchronously across multiple channels and devoid of any constitutional basis.
This is not a mere political conflict. Nor is it a normal political campaign. What we are witnessing has all the hallmarks of an Active Measures operation – disinformation and psychological operations designed to undermine citizens’ trust in the state, challenge the constitutional order, and weaken the structures of sovereignty. This is not about fair debate. It is about eroding the sense of reality and the meaning of collective action. We are under attack on a cognitive level, with a long-term goal of destroying national cohesion by dismantling trust in the fundamental institutions of the state.
The term Active Measures (Russian: Aktivnoye Mieropriyatya) comes from the arsenal of the Soviet KGB and is now used and developed by the Russian FSB and GRU services. It refers to a set of operational activities whose purpose is not to obtain information, as in classic espionage, but rather to actively shape reality in enemy states, especially by sowing chaos, undermining trust in institutions, stirring up social and ethnic conflicts, supporting extreme narratives on both sides of the dispute, and weakening the cohesion of the national community. It is a war without tanks, waged through narratives, emotions, leaks, pseudo-independent analyses, and so-called experts.
Very often, the perpetrators of such scenarios are politicians and journalists who are not agents but who, unknowingly, serve the interests of a foreign state. Their actions are often marked by resentment, ideological blindness or a desire for personal revenge. They can be divided into Class A, i.e., direct operations: sabotage, infiltration, bribery, and Class B, i.e., cognitive operations: disinformation, manipulation of public debate, sowing suspicion, and blurring reality. Poland is currently the target of Class B operations, which aim to destroy trust in elections – the most important mechanism for legitimising power in a democracy.
A false flag operation is a method that has been known for centuries. Its essence is impersonation: the aggressor pretends to be someone else – a victim, a democrat, a defender of freedom. They act ostensibly in the name of principles that they themselves destroy. In modern conflicts, operations of this type involve the services of a foreign state (e.g. Russia) causing chaos in an enemy country through its own citizens. They organise media coverage, construct false narratives, and inspire protests – but they do so in such a way as to make it look like a civil or democratic movement.
A false flag is precisely about deceiving
the public about the source of the actions
‘Defenders of democracy’ are created who, in fact, pursue the goals of the aggressor – they undermine legitimate elections, demand ‘state reform’, suggest the existence of a ‘deep state’ or call for the creation of extraordinary institutions to dismantle the existing order.
Such actions are not only destabilising but also dangerous in terms of the continuity of statehood. In the Polish constitutional system, for example, the president plays a fundamental role: he appoints judges and generals, represents the state internationally, serves as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and safeguards the continuity of power. Attempting to delegitimise him without legal grounds is not just a constitutional dispute. It is an act that undermines the cohesion of the state as a whole.
In geopolitics, this is one of the most effective ways to weaken a nation’s ability to defend itself. A crisis of confidence in institutions erodes decision-making capacity, paralyses the political system, and paves the way for external intervention, whether legal, media-based, economic, or even military.
Such operations have been tested many times before. In the US in 2020-2021, attempts to delegitimise the presidential election results were partly inspired by Russian and Chinese disinformation, fuelled by both the far right and the far left. In Moldova in 2023, protests were organised against alleged fraud, even though the elections were recognised as legitimate by all international institutions. In Georgia and Ukraine, operations causing social unrest under the banner of ‘defending democracy’ led to deep crises that were exploited by external forces. The same signs appeared everywhere: false defenders of values, emotional moral rhetoric and calls for a ‘reset’ or ‘renewal of the state,’ with foreign services profiting in the background.
In Poland today, we are at the beginning of a similar scenario. This is not a political debate. This is not a normal argument. This is a cognitive war. And the 2025 presidential election is its first, frontal battlefield. We are facing a frontal attack on the foundations of our statehood.
This is why the events surrounding the presidential election today are of fundamental importance, both politically and in terms of the system and civilisation. In a constitutional system, the president is not merely a figurehead. The office embodies the continuity of the state, appoints judges and commanders, represents Poland internationally and upholds the Constitution. Attempting to strip the president of his legitimacy without any legal basis is not just a dispute over a person, but a blow to the very structure of the state. Such action does not remain confined to public debate.
If entrenched, it could lead to a constitutional crisis, which, with favourable media coverage and external pressure, could result in paralysis and, in extreme cases, constitutional chaos. What is today referred to as ‘the question of the rule of law’ may tomorrow become the question of whether Poland still exists as an integrated state entity.
That is why this war is not about elections.
It is about everything.
The Facts: what is happening – a sequence of events
What is unfolding before our eyes today is not a series of random events or the usual dynamics of a political dispute following presidential elections. We are dealing with a methodical sequence of actions which, when analysed as a whole, form a clear vector: the destabilisation of the constitutional order of the Republic of Poland.
The first and most visible element is the public questioning of the legality of Karol Nawrocki’s election as President of the Republic of Poland. Although the elections were held in accordance with constitutional procedures, and their results were confirmed by the National Electoral Commission (PKW) and not effectively challenged in any court, politicians from the ruling coalition launched a frontal campaign to delegitimise them. Accusations of alleged fraud and manipulation have been made, unsupported by any facts or new findings.
The next stage was to shift the focus from the election result itself to the very possibility of the president being sworn in. There was talk that the president could not take office, that a ‘constitutional pause’ or ‘temporary replacement’ by the Speaker of the Sejm was needed.
What is more, suggestions were made to replace the Speaker of the Sejm precisely so that the politician most involved in questioning the legality of Nawrocki’s election could de facto take over the role of the head of state. This is more than just rhetoric – it is an attempt to circumvent the constitutional mechanism through procedural violence, in which the Sejm majority is trying to seize prerogatives for which there is no constitutional basis.
At the same time, a coordinated attack is underway on legally functioning state institutions that remain outside the direct control of the government. Since the beginning of the term in 2023, the following institutions have been targeted: the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT), the Constitutional Tribunal (TK) and the National Bank of Poland. It is worth noting that the National Broadcasting Council, the Constitutional Tribunal and the National Bank of Poland are constitutional bodies, and attacking them – undermining their existence, demanding ‘new compositions’ and refusing to respect their decisions – already bears the hallmarks of a constitutional coup. The IPN, although not mentioned in the constitution, is one of the last bastions of historical policy based on sovereignty and is therefore a target of disintegration efforts.
The fourth, extremely important thread, is the operation being carried out at the international level, with the participation of politicians from the ruling coalition. It consists of the systematic delegitimisation of Poland in European Union institutions through passivity, feigned diplomacy, and the deliberate avoidance of a firm defence of the national interest at a time when Europe is going through its greatest geopolitical crisis since the Second World War.
There is a war going on in Ukraine, Israel is striking Iran, Germany is intensifying its pressure for federalisation, and many EU member states are seeking strategic separation from the United States. At this very moment, Poland, as a NATO and EU border state, should be active, assertive, united and clear. Instead, we are faced with deliberate sluggishness, a lack of vision and external consent to gradually strip us of our sovereignty. Part of this process is taking place with the full consent or even cooperation of those in power, which is one of the most dangerous manifestations of this operation.
Finally, all of this takes place with full media synchronisation. At the same time, the topics of ‘illegal elections’, ‘fraud’ and ‘an unrecognised president’ appear in several major newsrooms. This message is not the result of natural development; it is more akin to orchestration, with identical vocabulary, emotional gradation and convergence of arguments and sources. In the context of cognitive warfare, this effect – a massive media onslaught designed to replace facts with emotions – constitutes the fundamental tool of modern influence operations.
This sequence — from undermining the election and attacking the inauguration to assaulting constitutional institutions, displaying international passivity, and synchronising the media — forms a coherent operation whose logic extends far beyond politics. It is an attack on the very essence of statehood.
Analysis: Features of Active Measures operations
– a textbook example
Observing the current political situation in Poland, it is difficult not to notice that we are dealing with an operation with an almost textbook structure and dynamics when it comes to Active Measures. In the classic Soviet approach – continued and developed today by the Russian FSB and GRU — such an operation does not consist of a single spectacular act of sabotage, but of long-term, coordinated and blurred cognitive action, the aim of which is not to convince anyone of a specific version of reality, but to undermine trust in any version of reality at all.
The first and most characteristic element of this operation is controlled disinformation. We are not dealing with blatant lies – on the contrary, what dominates are ‘questions’, insinuations, suggestions, rhetorical phrases such as ‘can we be sure?’, ‘was everything fair?’, ‘has the system been manipulated?’ This technique does not require evidence – all that is needed is to spread uncertainty. Journalists express ‘concern’, citizens ask ‘questions’, experts raise ‘doubts’ – all based on carefully measured language of understatement. As a result, it is not specific claims but the very atmosphere of suspicion that begins to dominate the public debate.
The second feature of the operation is cognitive warfare, which is not about determining who is right, but rather about destroying society’s ability to accept any argument as valid. Rather than pointing fingers, the aim is to ensure that nobody trusts the election results, that everyone doubts the fairness of the process and that the concept of ‘president’ becomes controversial.
Rather than attacking facts, this operation attacks trust itself as a social category. Consequently, there is no longer any common ground on which to agree, because ‘everyone has their own version’ and ‘no one knows what really happened’. In such an atmosphere, the state becomes ungovernable.
Another element is reversed axiology, whereby legal and constitutional actions are presented as allegedly undemocratic. In this mechanism, the executive or parliamentary authority attempts to strip the head of state of their legitimacy, despite them being elected in accordance with the law and with full transparency of procedures. The normal functioning of constitutional bodies, such as the Constitutional Tribunal, the National Bank of Poland and the National Broadcasting Council, is presented as a ‘threat to democracy’. This inverted language causes the public to confuse order with chaos and reform with abuse. In a climate of social fatigue and cognitive overload, it is easy to blur the boundaries of the rule of law under the guise of defending it.
Another important aspect of the operation is its multi-channel nature. Actions are not limited to a single medium or institution. Journalists, activists, politicians, ‘experts’, non-governmental organisations and, most importantly, external channels such as European Union institutions, foreign think tanks, and embassies all work in parallel. This creates a multi-voice effect that gives the illusion of widespread belief that ‘something is going on.’
In reality, this is the result of operational synchronisation, which is characteristic of mature forms of Active Measures. In classic warfare, actions are carried out on the front line. In cognitive warfare, the front line is the entire information reality – and everything that can shape beliefs.
Finally, and perhaps most dangerously, the vector is not indigenous.
All of these actions fit perfectly
into the geostrategic interests of
the Russian Federation and, indirectly, Germany.
From Moscow’s perspective, this operation is a tool for dismantling the statehood of a NATO country located on the eastern front, whose stability threatens plans to rebuild the sphere of influence. From Berlin’s perspective, the current turmoil serves to implement a model of federalisation of the European Union, in which Poland is symbolically disarmed and becomes a ‘contextual state’ – functioning only as an EU subsystem, rather than as an entity capable of opposition. In this sense, the Active Measures operation currently underway in Poland is not an experiment. It is part of a long-term strategy to break up Central Europe as the axis of resistance on the continent.
When we realise that each of the components described above was launched almost simultaneously – undermining the election results, attempts to block the swearing-in ceremony, attacks on constitutional institutions, international delegitimisation, a massive media campaign – it is difficult to talk about ordinary politics. This is no longer a dispute over power. These are actions recognisable in the operational history of Soviet and post-Soviet services. And unfortunately, Poland is once again becoming a battlefield where the goal is not to take over the government, but to destroy the very possibility of governing.
The logic of false flag– a war masquerading as democracy
One of the most disturbing aspects of the current events in Poland is their consistency with the classic pattern of false flag operations, i.e. actions carried out by one centre but disguised as another in order to confuse the observer, shift responsibility and create a narrative that disarms the victim before they even realise they are the target of an attack.
In this case, we are dealing with an operation carried out by people and political circles who present themselves as defenders of democracy, the rule of law and freedom, but whose actions, in terms of content, form, and effect – fit perfectly into the logic of cognitive aggression used by Russia for decades. This is no longer even inspiration – it is an operational blueprint.
The current sequence of events in Poland is inspired by recent precedents in other countries. For example, in the United States, after the 2020–21 presidential election, there was a violent campaign to question the result, stir up emotions, and divide society. This campaign was largely fuelled by troll farms in St Petersburg and Beijing. Russian cognitive operations actively promoted both right-wing and extremely progressive narratives to cause maximum emotional chaos and a loss of common ground.
In Ukraine in 2013-2014 and in Georgia, several attempts were made to undermine democratic processes in this way, portraying legally elected authorities as undemocratic, Western-controlled, corrupt, or illegal. In each of these cases, the mechanics were similar: a seemingly grassroots civil movement, radical moral language, the use of social media and local opinion leaders, and the complete alignment of actions with Moscow’s strategic goals.
In Poland, the same method has been used for years in a narrative in which the destruction of state institutions is presented as a ‘fight for freedom’ – which, as we remember, has been the case since the beginning of the PiS government.
Attempts to prevent the swearing-in of a legally elected president are supposedly a ‘defence of democracy’. Undermining the competence and legality of constitutional bodies – such as the National Broadcasting Council, the Constitutional Tribunal and the National Bank of Poland – is presented as ‘systemic reform’ and ‘restoring order’.
In fact, we are witnessing the opposite process: the dismantling of the constitutional pillars of the state under the guise of a fight for democracy. This is a classic strategy of reverse legitimacy – actions aimed at depriving the opponent of moral and legal legitimacy, regardless of facts and procedures. All this is being carried out by circles which, in the eyes of the public, present themselves as ‘democratic’, ‘pro-European’ or ‘progressive’.
This is what makes this operation a classic false flag: actions are carried out in the name of Western values, but the result is the breakdown of state structures, institutional chaos, international isolation and deep fragmentation of the national community – exactly what Moscow has wanted for thirty years.
A false flag does not work through force, but through authority. When those perceived as defenders of democracy carry out a scenario of weakening the state, society loses the ability to recognise who is really acting in its own interests and who is merely a tool in someone else’s game.
A false flag is therefore not just a tactic – it is a profound distortion of the symbolic space, in which aggression is called defence and the decay of institutions is called reform.
In this way, war no longer looks like war, and the victim begins to feel ashamed of their own defence. This is why cognitive operations are so difficult to recognise: they do not come in uniforms, but in suits; not with weapons, but with microphones; not under a red banner, but under a blue flag with yellow stars.
What is happening today in Poland is not fundamentally different from the operations previously carried out in the countries of Georgia, Moldova or the United States. Only the language and scenery change – the logic remains the same: disarm the state with its own language, question the legitimacy of its institutions with the help of its own citizens, and bring about a moment when no one knows who is telling the truth – and thus the truth ceases to matter. In such a cognitive vacuum, there is no need for tanks or missiles – all that is needed is well-designed chaos.
Organised networks of information diversion also play an extremely important role in this false flag operation, whose aim is not to convince anyone, but to blow up social cohesion from within. One of the most visible examples in Poland is the group operating under the slogan ‘Silni Razem’ (‘Strong Together’) – a group of seemingly spontaneous social media users who in reality act as a digital ideological militia tasked with attacking, discrediting and psychologically suppressing anyone who expresses views other than those accepted by the liberal-progressive mainstream. Such networks are not a civil movement in the classic sense. They operate using mechanisms familiar from information warfare: mass reproduction of messages, the use of memes as emotional weapons, personal harassment of opponents, and mass reporting of content hostile to their narrative to social media administrators. Members of these networks are often not professional trolls, but their behaviour is the product of deep cognitive indoctrination, reminiscent of the methods used by sects. A black-and-white language prevails, with no room for doubt, questions or nuance. Anyone who disagrees with the line is an enemy. And the enemy has no right to be in the public sphere. The enemy has no right to exist.
From a psychological point of view, ‘Strong Together’ is an example of a modern form of social cognitive automatism – a mechanism in which people do not interpret reality, but react to a set of learned signals, slogans and symbols. These are not active participants in the debate – they are terminals of a self-perpetuating programme. Their main function is not to convince neutral audiences, but to poison the debate so that no one wants to speak up.
Chilling effect, self-censorship, silence – these are the most valuable resources for information operations. Such networks – although presented as grassroots, spontaneous and ‘progressive’ – perform exactly the same function as organised diversionary groups that used to break up states from within in the past. They do not wear uniforms, but they have avatars. They do not use dynamite, but mass reporting to social media administrators about the ‘hate speech’ allegedly used by their opponents. Their weapon is not argument, but mockery, defamation and harassment. For the average internet user, encountering this machine means only one thing: the fear of speaking out. Where people are afraid to speak, the truth is the first casualty.
In this sense, networks such as ‘Silni Razem’ are a tool of third-generation cognitive aggression, not physical or informational, but identity-based. Their existence not only poisons the debate. They reconfigure concepts:
patriotism becomes ‘fascism’, sovereignty becomes ‘isolationism’, the constitution becomes ‘an obstacle to reform’
And that is precisely why they are becoming an informal infrastructure for false flag operations, disguised as ‘social opposition’ but in reality pursuing the logic of cognitive dismantling of the state by the decision-making centre of the entire operation – Moscow.
The strategic goals of Russia and Germany
To understand the deeper meaning of the operation to destabilise Poland, it is not enough to look at it solely through the prism of internal political struggle. It must be placed in a broader geopolitical context – as an instrument in the hands of two powers which, although seemingly antagonistic, are today working in parallel to weaken Poland as a sovereign political entity.
Russia and Germany, each for its own reasons, see Poland as an obstacle to the realisation of their long-term interests.
A strong, stable Poland, rooted in national consciousness and strategically anchored in an alliance with the US, is a problem for both neo-imperial Moscow and federalist Berlin. Therefore, the goal is no longer just to change the government or win the media narrative. The goal is something deeper: to dismantle the structure of Poland’s statehood.
From Russia’s point of view, the operation to destabilise Poland internally is part of a long-standing strategy to dismantle NATO’s security architecture on its eastern flank. Poland is the most important frontline state of the Alliance – in terms of population, geography, military and logistics. It is also a country connecting the Three Seas region – a project aimed at making Central Europe independent from the influence of Moscow and Berlin. For this reason, undermining Poland’s credibility – through constitutional chaos, questioning the legitimacy of the authorities and paralysing institutions – is becoming a key tool for disarming NATO without firing a single shot. If Poland is shown to be incapable of maintaining constitutional order, its voice in NATO will become less audible and its allies’ willingness to cooperate will be significantly reduced.
Russia is also seeking to disintegrate the Three Seas Initiative, seeing it as a threat to its plans to rebuild its sphere of influence. If Poland is discredited as a regional leader – through institutional crisis, military weakness and chaotic foreign policy – the Three Seas Initiative will collapse. Countries such as Romania, the Czech Republic and the Baltic states will be forced to look for other points of reference, and then pressure from Berlin and pragmatism towards Moscow will naturally emerge. In addition, the constitutional chaos in Poland is a tool for Russia to break down Polish national identity – the same identity that has been an obstacle to imperial projects in the region for centuries. A country that does not know who its legitimate president is, that undermines its own institutions and where patriotism is presented as a threat to democracy – such a country ceases to be an opponent. It becomes an open field to be conquered.
Germany, on the other hand, although it does not conduct hybrid activities with such an overt structure as Russia, is pursuing its goal methodically, through the institutional and axiological instruments of the European Union.
Berlin’s main goal is to regain its position as a metastate in Central Europe – not through tanks, but through treaties, regulations, legal control mechanisms and axiological pressure.
The key tool here is the European Union, whose institutions are increasingly being used as a mechanism to discipline member states rather than as a platform for equal partners. The revitalisation of Germany’s legal and ideological dominance is taking place through a system of pressure on the courts, the media, the energy sector, education and public finances. If Poland is forced to ‘repair its relations with the EU’ as a result of internal chaos, this will effectively mean accepting an externally imposed model of governance.
Berlin is primarily concerned about Poland’s energy independence, which is disrupting German plans to make the region dependent on gas and ‘green industry’ technologies controlled by German corporations. The Germans are also irritated by Poland’s historical policy, which reminds them of Germany’s responsibility for World War II, Yalta and the post-war erasure of Central Europe’s sovereignty. Revenge for independence – energy, symbolic and strategic – is not a figure of speech. It is Berlin’s policy pursued under the banner of ‘the rule of law’, ‘European values’ and ‘restoring trust’.
As a result, both countries – Russia and Germany – although acting with different methods and from different directions, currently have a common interest: to weaken Poland as a sovereign, culturally rooted and independent player. Russia wants chaos. Germany wants subordination.
Their goals are not mutually exclusive – they complement each other. And Poland, if it fails to understand this logic, will become a space devoid of decision-making capacity – both towards the East and the West. This is precisely why the operation to undermine the presidential election is not merely a domestic conflict. It is a key arena of 21st-century geopolitical competition in Central Europe.
In this context, one more key strategic goal of Germany should be added: the final invalidation and silencing of Polish demands for reparations for World War II. The issue of reparations, which has been consistently raised by the Polish authorities in recent years, not only reminds the world of Germany’s unresolved responsibility for crimes, destruction and occupation, but also poses a real threat to Berlin’s axiological hegemony within the European Union. In the eyes of the German political class, any recognition of Polish claims – even symbolic – would open a Pandora’s box that could call into question the foundations of Germany’s post-war ‘moral leadership’ in Europe.
Therefore, weakening Poland as a sovereign state, and especially as an entity capable of making historical claims, is a goal for Berlin that is not only political but existential. In a scenario of constitutional chaos, in which the legitimacy of the Polish authorities is questioned, any demand for reparations can be presented as ‘unrepresentative’, ‘discredited’ or ‘irresponsible’ – and, as a result, permanently invalidated on the international stage. Thus, the operation to delegitimise the Polish state serves not only to change the balance of power in Europe, but also to erase once and for all Germany’s uncomfortable reckoning with history.
From Berlin’s perspective, this would be a double triumph: firstly, a return to its role as the unquestioned decision-making centre of the EU, and secondly, the final silencing of an issue that could undermine the foundations of the post-WW2 political order, based on the silence surrounding the suffering of the peoples of Central Europe. Poland, confused, internally divided and internationally marginalised, will not be able to act as a voice demanding historical justice. And this, from the point of view of German raison d’état, is a strategic value of the highest order.
The issue of reparations is particularly important for Berlin right now because the newly elected Polish president, Karol Nawrocki, clearly and unequivocally declared during his election campaign that extracting reparations from Germany for World War II would be an important part of his presidential agenda. He pointed out that Poland, as a victim of the greatest armed conflict of the 20th century, can no longer remain silent about the fact that no serious compensation has ever been paid for the extermination of its citizens or for the destruction of its state, culture and infrastructure.
This announcement struck at the very heart of the German strategy of silence and delegitimisation of the issue of reparations. That is why, already during the election campaign, Karol Nawrocki became the target of an unprecedented wave of media and political attacks based on insinuations, half-truths and emotional demonisation. Even then, it was clear that the media narrative largely resonated with Berlin’s interests, and some journalists and politicians – personally, financially or ideologically linked to German institutions – began to openly question not only his views but also his right to hold the highest office in the state.
The current operation to delegitimise Karol Nawrocki’s election and prevent him from taking office is therefore a natural extension of this strategy. Moreover, these actions are supported by politicians, including the prime minister himself, who have been associated for years with German influence structures, think tanks and transnational organisations whose interest is not in a strong and independent Poland, but in a predictable, submissive and ‘Europeanised’ country.
These facts clearly show that the struggle to prevent a legally elected president from taking office has a specific German national interest behind it. It is not only about defending their historical narrative, but also about blocking the process of inter-state reckoning, which, given the precedent, could have a domino effect across Europe. Germany cannot afford this. That is why it is doing everything in its power to ensure that Poland, before it can demand justice, ceases to be treated as a country capable of articulating its own claims. The operation to delegitimise President Nawrocki is therefore a strategic protective mechanism for Berlin, carried out by others but very much in its own interest.
Escalation scenarios
If the current operation to delegitimise the legally elected President Karol Nawrocki is not stopped – either by state institutions or by public opinion – we must expect another phase of escalation, which could lead to a real breakdown of the constitutional order in Poland. Observing the logic of previous Active Measures operations in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as analysing internal political and media tensions, we can identify at least three possible – and simultaneously developing – scenarios for destabilisation.
Firstly: institutional escalation. After President Nawrocki is sworn in, we can expect attempts to invalidate his decisions ex post, especially regarding the appointment of judges, armed forces commanders and ambassadors. This will be achieved through Sejm resolutions, rulings by ‘alternative’ judicial structures, and referrals to international tribunals and EU bodies. The aim of such an operation will not be legal effectiveness – as its chances of success are slim – but to create interpretative chaos in which some institutions cease to recognise the decisions of others.
In such an environment, the concept of ‘legality’ disappears and the state becomes paralysed. This is a well-known technique for dismantling institutions, previously used, among other states, in Moldova and Ukraine in 2005-2007. To some extent, this has been happening since the beginning of the term of office at the end of 2023 – examples include the illegal takeover of public media and the illegal appointment of an acting Deputy Prosecutor General.
Secondly: the use of the idea of election fraud as an emotional and axiological figure for the consolidation of the liberal-left camp. Just as the Smoleńsk disaster was a symbolic axis of mobilisation and memory for the patriotic side, so the ‘rigged elections of 2025’ could become a founding myth for the coalition circles, around which a political identity, a language of moral superiority and legitimacy for extraordinary measures are being built. In this view, President Nawrocki is not an opponent – he is a ‘product of fraud’, and therefore the rules of standard political play do not apply to him. This way of thinking can lead to the justification of unconstitutional actions, because a ‘higher truth’ demands extraordinary measures. This is dangerous because it blurs the lines between politics and staged rebellion. In the background, Russia’s kinetic actions against the main actors of the Polish patriotic milieu may be lurking, less visible in the fog of confusion caused by this turmoil.
Thirdly: the collapse of constitutional order and the emergence of parallel structures. As legal chaos grows, we can expect to see the re-emergence of so-called democracy defence committees – this time not as a protest movement, but as quasi-political and constitutional bodies that will begin to announce ‘alternative social verdicts, appoint ‘shadow presidents’ or organise ‘social tribunals’. This type of action has been tested before in Latin America, the Caucasus and Central Asia, always with the same result: the destruction of the authority of state institutions and the shift of the centre of decision-making to extra-legal structures.
In the Polish context, this would mean an attempt to install a political dual power: on the one hand, a legal president, and on the other, an informal but media and internationally-supported structure of ‘civil representation’. This would result in executive paralysis and deep social disorientation, which could be used as a pretext for further intervention by EU institutions – no longer in the form of dialogue, but of crisis management.
All three scenarios are not hypothetical – their elements are already appearing in the public, media and political sphere. Their full activation is merely an operational decision, either internal or external. In such a scenario, the state ceases to be the guarantor of order, instead becoming a field of competing narratives about legality, truth, and sovereignty. This is not a political difference of opinion. This is a systemic dismantling of statehood – carried out with kid gloves, but with the precision of a surgical knife cut.
Final diagnosis: Poland as a target of cognitive warfare
What we are seeing today in Poland – from the questioning of the legitimacy of the presidential elections, through the destabilisation of constitutional institutions, to the creation of parallel media and political narratives – is not a mere parliamentary crisis. This is not a dispute between parties, programmatic differences or controversial legislative decisions. We are dealing with a classic hybrid operation, conducted at the cognitive, institutional and symbolic levels, whose goal is not to gain power, but to invalidate the very meaning of state structures.
The cognitive war being waged against Poland today does not come dressed in uniform, nor is it announced in parliament or called a war campaign. Its aim is to destroy citizens’ ability to interpret political reality together. If we no longer know who has been legally elected, whom to trust, what is fact and what is narrative, then the basic code of social trust — without which no democratic order can be maintained — breaks down. This is the essence of cognitive warfare: disintegrating the space of meaning so that sovereignty can no longer be exercised effectively.
In this model, it is not about replacing one party with another or replacing the president with a more ‘European’ one. It is about something much deeper: it is about Poland ceasing to be perceived – and ceasing to perceive itself – as a sovereign state capable of acting independently within its own constitutional order. What is at stake in this operation is not the government, but the very identity of Poland. If the elections can be delegitimised, the functions of institutions blurred and the belief that everything is relative and nothing matters entrenched, then there will be no need to conquer territory. It will be enough for Poland to become a space without structure – a political body without a bone structure.
This is the direction taken by a concept which, although it has not been formally announced anywhere, is the informal goal of many European and Russian circles at the same time: to transform Poland into a ‘contextual state’. This means a country that does not exist as an independent strategic actor, but only as a function of larger structures – the EU, NATO, the Western energy market or the German industrial system.
The contextual state does not make decisions – it ‘reacts’ to reality. It does not shape relationships – it only “implements” them. It has no mission – it has a schedule of directives.
In such a model, strong constitutional institutions are unnecessary, a strong president is unnecessary, and a sovereign nation is unnecessary. All that is needed is an executive class, well synchronised with the interests of foreign and media centres, which maintains the appearance of democratic processes while in fact translating instructions into national regulations. Poland as a state ceases to be a subject. It becomes an environment. A functional territory.
And that is precisely why the operation to delegitimise the 2025 elections is not just another chapter in a political dispute. It is a decisive test of whether Poland will retain its ability to be a state in the classical sense – with a legitimate centre of power, functional institutions and a community capable of self-organisation – or whether it will undergo a process of decomposition that has already affected many peripheral countries. This test is ongoing. Everything indicates that we will not pass it unless we understand that we are the target of a war, even though no shots are being fired. This is a war for meaning. For legality. For memory. For existence.
Conclusion: building an epistemic shield
In the face of the cognitive warfare being waged against Poland — which aims to delegitimise the president and destroy the state’s capacity for self-determination — it is necessary to establish a new approach to national defence.
An army, missile systems and even advanced cybersecurity technologies are no longer enough. The threat has not come from across the border, but from perception. In this sense, cognition is becoming a new battlefield, and the protection of the state’s epistemic infrastructure a new strategic imperative.
Therefore, Poland must urgently begin the process of building an epistemic defence shield – a set of tools, structures and strategies aimed at recognising, neutralising and pre-empting cognitive and narrative operations of hostile origin. A key element of this strategy should be the establishment of a National Centre for Cognitive Operations Recognition (CROP) – an institution operating at the intersection of intelligence analysis, semiotics, social psychology and state security. The CROP would be tasked with monitoring the public space for the presence of Active Measures vectors, identifying disinformation matrices and locating channels of propagation (from troll networks to international centres of influence).
The second pillar of this new doctrine should be the development of a national cognitive resilience system, i.e. a network of educational and strategic institutions that teach how to recognise manipulation, decode persuasive techniques and understand the language of psychological operations. Such programmes should operate not only at the level of decision-making elites, but also in higher education, public media, and training for the administration and the military. The ability of society to recognise cognitive operations must become an element of Polish national security.
The third – and perhaps most important – step is to fully recognise the cognitive domain as equivalent to the military and cyber domains. This means the need to create a strategic doctrine of cognitive defence, whose goal will not be censorship, but building resilience, strengthening social cohesion and protecting the state’s ability to articulate its own narrative. In this doctrine, an attack on an institution through false narratives is tantamount to an attack on critical infrastructure, and its neutralisation should be treated with the same priority as defence against a missile attack.
However, it should be clearly stated that none of these reforms will be possible as long as those who participate in the destruction of the constitutional order remain in power. The current political elites from the ruling coalition, who themselves are engaged in activities that undermine the foundations of sovereignty, delegitimise elections, attack constitutional institutions and support cognitive operations of hostile origin, are not only incapable of building such a shield, but also constitute its main threat. Their exercise of power today is a real risk to the existence of the Republic of Poland as a state.
Therefore, the first step towards rebuilding cognitive security is to remove these people from power in a manner consistent with the constitution, but decisive and irreversible. Only then can we begin to build a new, sovereign cognitive immunity system that will not only protect Poland from Active Measures operations, but also make it the subject of its own narrative, rather than its passive recipient. Without this, Poland will remain a state that knows its territorial borders but loses control over the borders of consciousness.
And this is precisely the goal of every cognitive war: to conquer a country not by force, but by destroying its meaning.
This text was originally published in Polish here:
https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/733158-wojna-o-legalnosc-polska-jako-cel-operacji-false-flag
