Urgent strengthening of the Polish Armed Forces is essential
What about the K2 program? [OPINION]
Jakub Palowski
24 25.11.2024, Defence 24
Growing threats are making the strengthening of the Polish Armed Forces, and in a two-three-year perspective, an increasingly urgent task. One of its elements is the realization of the K2PL basic tank program, which, in addition to operational capabilities, will also provide industrial potential and opportunities for further development for the Armored Forces.
The war in Ukraine is now entering a very dangerous phase. It is expected that the new President Donald Trump administration will want to bring about a cessation of hostilities and a ceasefire. However, this, paradoxically, does not mean a decrease in the threat from Russia to NATO countries, including Poland, but a further increase. This is because, after the ceasefire, the Russian Federation will not “use up” manufactured and refurbished equipment in the fight against Ukraine but will stockpile it.
At the same time, the Russian army, full of men with combat experience and increased in numbers to 1.5 million soldiers, will pose an increasing threat to NATO countries. Moscow will not be able to maintain such a force forever (the majority are well-paid professional and contract soldiers), but for a few years, it certainly will. This makes it relatively soon—2-4 years after the ceasefire—that Russia may reach the maximum of its combat capabilities against NATO. This is because some of the modernization projects in NATO countries—such as the purchases of Leopard 2A8 tanks with active protection systems in Germany, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Lithuania, the growing number of purchases of modern CV-90 BWPs, but also a number of other programs in various domains, including the fifth-generation F-35 fighters, which more countries, most recently Romania, are equipping themselves with—will provide a leap in combat capabilities after 2030. And these programs will be carried out with a high degree of industrial security, and probably also taking into account the evolution of the battlefield and the lessons of the war in Ukraine. This means that Russia may seek to strike against NATO countries earlier.
Military officials are also sounding the alarm that the threat could come at relatively short notice. In a recent interview with “Rzeczpospolita”, the Operational Commander of the Armed Forces, Major General Maciej Klisz, when asked about the ceasefire in Ukraine, in the context of the consequences for Poland, said:
I even think that we should not only not slow down, but actually speed up our armaments, because we probably won’t have the eight years of comfort that Ukraine had between 2014 and 2022.
Maj. Gen. Maciej Klisz, Operational Commander of the Polish Armed Forces in an interview presented in “Rzeczpospolita.”
Gen. Klisz added that Russian war production is important for the economy, so it will continue and even increase, as reducing it would cause economic problems. General Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s ambassador and former chief of staff of the Ukrainian army, says a breakthrough on the battlefield could come after 2027, as Russia currently lacks resources and technology. With that said, a ceasefire could bring that moment closer, and Russia’s hybrid actions could make it more difficult and slow down (in fact, this is already happening, including in Poland) the building of Europe’s resilience to aggression.
Western analysts also speak of a similar threat, pointing out that in the second half of the current decade, the US—especially under the new administration—may decide to reduce its engagement in Europe, placing more emphasis on the Indo-Pacific region. Such a ‘decision’ may also be taken by China’s political leadership by invading Taiwan, presumably in coordination with Russia to ‘tie up’ some of the Western states’ capabilities in Europe. s Professor Justin Bronk of the UK’s RUSI Centre wrote as recently as December 2023, “In the event of such a confrontation (between China and the US in the Pacific), Russia will have a strong incentive to seize the only opportunity in a generation to breach NATO, while the US will not be able to effectively support Europe. No later than 2026-2028, Russian industry will be after a few years of military production, allowing it to rebuild forces strengthened by combat experience.”
All this has implications for NATO countries, especially the most vulnerable like Poland. For the threat may come at a time when a comprehensive modernization and full transformation of the Armed Forces has not been achieved. All the more reason, however, to pursue those programs which, given the planned timetable and delivery capabilities, offer the prospect of strengthening the Polish Armed Forces in the short term.
An example of such a program is the purchase of the K2 tank. Next year, the Polish Army should have 180 such vehicles at its disposal, and the purchase of 180 more is being negotiated. The second contract, unlike the first one, is also to cover technical security and support vehicles and technology transfer, including tank production, and some of the vehicles will also be in a new configuration, probably with an active protection system, allowing, for example, to fight drones.
The second contract for K2 tanks will therefore make it possible to, in fact, complete the first stage of this armored program, as 180 tanks are not even enough to rearm all existing units of the 16th Mechanized Division, let alone newly created ones—whether within the 16th Division or the new 1st Legion Infantry Division. Thanks to the implementation of the second stage of the K2 program, the Armored Forces will be largely modernized in a fairly comprehensive manner, as the rearmament of the 18th Mechanized Division with Abrams tanks purchased from the Americans and the 11th Lubuskie Armored Cavalry Division with Leopard 2’s will be completed in parallel. The Armored Forces, along with the Missile and Artillery Forces, and partly the air and missile defense forces, are likely to be the ones with significantly greater capabilities already in a few years’ time, although still lower—in terms of numbers—than assumed in the development plans.
In addition to the tanks themselves, the K2PL program also includes the construction in Poland of facilities to support the operation and production of new tanks, together with the development of a new version. What does this mean in practice? Firstly, thanks to the development of the K2PL variant, it will be possible to quickly introduce tested and proven modifications to the already existing K2 tanks in the Gap Filler version, related, for example, to providing protection against unmanned vessels. And all this will be able to be implemented in a single logistics system, without additional testing.
Secondly, facilities will be built not only for servicing but for the production of tanks and vehicles based on them, such as technical security vehicles. And here, paradoxically, is where one of the problems with the implementation of the K2PL program arises. The negotiated contract concerns 180 tanks and 81 support vehicles, of which only a part is to be built in Poland. According to unofficial information from Defence24.pl, the industrial side’s demand is that the cost associated with the construction of production lines should be included in the contract price. “Rzeczpospolita” also wrote about this. Only that this results in an increase in the unit price of the combat vehicle, and in addition the Armaments Agency negotiating the contract on the part of the Ministry of Defense has limited possibilities of subsidizing production, as the Ministry of State Assets has its responsibility here.
We already faced a similar situation in the Polish defense industry several years ago.
At the end of 2017 and the beginning of 2018, after an earlier redefinition of the program by the then Ministry of Defence (change of the leader from HSW to the headquarters of the Polish Armaments Group), a PGZ consortium submitted a bid in the “Homar’” rocket artillery program, which, as the Deputy Minister of Defense Wojciech Skurkiewicz later said, exceeded many times the budget planned for this task. This is because the offer “sewed in” the costs of building production lines for launchers and missiles, and the entire program included only three squadrons (less than 60 launchers and 1,800 GMLRS guided missiles), although the Strategic Defense Review conducted at the Ministry of Defence indicated the need to purchase at least nine.
The offer was rejected, 20 off-the-shelf HIMARS were purchased, and from 2022 onwards, purchases of two rocket artillery systems (Homar-K from the Republic of Korea and Homar-A, a Polonized HIMARS from the USA) began in parallel. In hindsight, it would have been better if this “expensive” production line had been established by then, regardless of whether it was to be financed by the Ministry of Defense or the former Ministry of the Treasury and now State Assets. Because now you could order more squadrons and more missiles already from the Polish line, with security of supply… and investing in your own economy.
And in the K2PL program it may be similar, as here too the capital weakness of the PGZ companies can be seen as they choose to “sew in” the cost of the entire production line into the contract offered to the Armament Agency. However, there is now a full-scale war going on abroad in Poland (and in 2017-18, and earlier when “HOMAR” was redefined, “only” to limited hybrid operations) and there is really no more time to waste. The Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of State Assets should come to an agreement on how to efficiently and effectively subsidize the construction of the K2PL tank production line. Because looking at the deterioration of the security situation, the consequences could be incomparably worse than in the “HOMAR” case.
“We are not implementing modernization programs, you can see the indecision, the sluggishness. We have not started the production of tanks. The assumption when we bought K2 tanks and K9 howitzers was to strengthen the Polish defense industry, absorb these technologies, and start production in Poland. Who is holding this back, paralyzing it? Is it only due to competence disputes or for other reasons? After all, our military needs tanks. If the Prime Minister and the head of the BBN say that we are threatened with war, why is the Polish Army not given equipment to fight? The agreements that concerned the purchase of tanks and howitzers were signed almost three years ago, and technology transfer was assumed. Who is blocking this and why? We have empty divisions, without equipment, and this applies to basically every type of military equipment. What is happening with “Borsuk?” After all, the contracts were supposed to be in place already last year. I’m not talking about what’s happening with ammunition anymore, because we’re standing still all the time, we don’t have the basic components. But at this point acquiring equipment, completing the army is an absolutely key objective,” says Lieutenant General Waldemar Skrzypczak, former commander of the Land Forces.
Gen. Waldemar Skrzypczak
We should add that, as in the case of the aforementioned rocket artillery program, the current contract is only one stage, as it will allow either the rearmament of one expanded division, or the existing structures of the 16th Mechanized Division and the first newly formed ones in the 1st Legion Infantry Division. Given that there is no turning back from further expansion of Land Forces formations (this is required not only by Poland’s situation but also by the new NATO force model) further orders of tanks (and other equipment) will be necessary. The expanded production line will therefore be used, to produce at least several hundred tanks for newly formed and reserve units in the long term.
There is also no doubt that the strengthening of the capabilities of the Polish Armed Forces, undertaken in the short term, also requires a number of other actions, related, for example, to training, communications, individual equipment or popularization of the use of unmanned systems and countermeasures. This does not change the fact that modernization programs for conventional equipment should be urgently pursued, as this equipment is still in use. Especially where there are real opportunities for quick results. This will allow the Polish Army’s capabilities to be strengthened, and very often in areas where allies either do not invest at all or do so slowly, waiting to rebuild their industrial capacity and taking a very high risk in a 2–5-year timeframe.
From the moment of the expected ceasefire in Ukraine, a kind of race against time will begin, and the urgent implementation of the modernization programs of the Polish Armed Forces is crucial not to lose this race. Because the cost of a possible defeat may be difficult to predict.
