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Poland Alone; 2024 PI Competition 2nd Prize
2024 Competition on the History of Poland Poland's History Recommended WWII

Poland Alone; 2024 PI Competition 2nd Prize

The Polish Fight Against the Totalitarian Ideologies of the 20th Century

by Christopher Repak

On November 11, 1918, Poles celebrated as their nation had once again regained independence after over 100 years of political, ethnic, and religious persecution. The aftermath of World War I would return Poland to the map. However, the Poles did not have time to revel in their newly found freedom and independence.

Immediately, the Polish state found its independence threatened by an invasion from the Communist forces of the Soviet Union. The Polish Army was pushed back to Warsaw, where, against all odds, the Poles made a desperate final stand and successfully repelled Soviet forces. British diplomat Lord Edgar d’Abernon called the victory “the eighteenth [most] decisive battle of the world.” He further stressed that the battle was a clash of civilizations.

Just as the Poles had saved Western Civilization when the Polish king Jan III Sobieski defeated the Muslim Turks of the Ottoman Empire at Vienna in 1683, Poland saved Europe from “an even more revolutionary threat, the fanatic tyranny of the Soviets.” After the Soviet-Polish war, Poland would face the next challenge to its independence in 1939, with the Nazi Germany invasion of Poland.

The Polish government initially saw the Soviet Union as the main threat to Poland’s independence. There was distrust between the Republic and the Revolutionary State during the Polish-Soviet War. Furthermore, Germany, the most obvious threat from the Western direction, had been effectively rendered a non-threat in the short term by the Treaty of Versailles.

Under the terms of Versailles, the German army had been reduced to 100,000 soldiers and lacked heavy weapons. Poland had an alliance with France, which would have led to Germany fighting a two-front war. This led Poland to believe its position was secured.

Germany had been weakened in the West, and Poland could count on Western support if it chose to invade. Unfortunately, though, the war did not proceed as the Poles desired. After the annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia, Germany invaded Poland in the early morning of September 1, 1939, after Poland had rejected German territorial demands. Britain and France, who had promised Poland protection, declared war against Germany on September 3, 1939. While France and Britain had military plans against the German Reich, they did not implement them.

On September 12, the British and French leadership decided not to take military action against the German Reich despite French forces outnumbering German forces 5 to 1 on the Western Front. The Germans took advantage of Western inaction and sought to destroy the Polish state as quickly as possible. In doing so, the German government deployed a relentless “total war” policy that did not discriminate between military and civilian targets.

The Poles fought valiantly and heroically, but upon the Soviet invasion of Poland on September 17 in accordance with the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the collapse of the Polish state appeared inevitable. On October 6, 1939, the final shots of the Polish campaign were heard as Polish soldiers near Kock surrendered after running out of ammunition. While the Poles failed to defend Poland in September of 1939, the Poles did not give up and sought to achieve victories against the unjust aggression placed upon them elsewhere.

The Battle of Monte Cassino

The origins of the Italian campaign would arise when Allied military planners sought to attack Germany from the south. The Polish chief of the armed forces, Wladyslaw Sikorski, believed that such a military operation would lead to a more rapid liberation of Polish territory. Such ambitions logically led the Poles to regroup in the Middle East and North Africa. Originally, Polish resources, especially manpower, were extremely limited. The Poles could only muster one brigade, the Independent Carpathian Rifle Brigade. However, Operation Barbarossa paved the way for the Sikorski-Mayski Agreement. This treaty allowed thousands of Poles imprisoned in the USSR to leave the country and assist the Polish military in the war effort to liberate their country.

These rendezvous would be the origins of the Polish Army of the East (APW) and the 2nd Polish Corps from there. The APW consisted of three groups. The “Rameses” were veterans of the North African campaign where Polish soldiers assisted the Allies at Tobruk and the Battle of Gazala. “The Orthodox” were the prisoners who came from the Soviet Union. Finally, the “Lords” were the Polish officers in the Middle East. The APW was deployed initially to garrisons in Iraq, where the Poles suffered from scorching temperatures, sand, storms, and disease.

At this time, Polish units were also being reformed. The APW began to adopt organizational models used by British forces rather than the current Soviet-style organization they were in. This resulted in the troops lacking manpower, as 71,000 men would have been necessary for the Polish force to maintain operational integrity in this model, while Anders only had 62,000 men at his disposal.

Therefore, rudimentary units were liquidated, the 7th Division became the army replenishment center, and the 2nd Tank Brigade was attached to the 6th Lviv Infantry Division (DP).

In 1942, the Germans were defeated at Stalingrad, the British found victory at ElAlamein, and the Americans secured oil facilities in French North Africa. An Allied invasion of Southern Europe became an ever more likely possibility, and on July 9, with the landings in Sicily, it became a reality. On May 27, Sikorski landed in Cairo to inspect Polish troops. Sikorski and British commanders decided to send a Polish unit to Europe. On July 21, the APW was reorganized, and the line units of the army became the famed 2nd Polish Corps.

Polish units were transported to Palestine to prepare to send the troops to Europe. The Poles were set to be combat-ready by January 1, 1944. Some hurdles had to be overcome before sending the troops. When arriving in Palestine, some soldiers of Jewish origin deserted to join the Israeli defense forces due to the influence of Zionist ideology. Furthermore, the previous commander-in-chief of the Polish Armed Forces, Sikorski, was killed in a plane crash.

There were also disagreements about how the 2nd Polish Corps should be utilized. The British hoped the Corps would replace British losses in British units. This suggestion was unacceptable to Anders, who wanted a uniformly large Polish unit. Such a unit could give Poland more leverage at a future peace conference, which could determine the sovereignty of a post-war Poland. The issue was manpower, making such a unit problematic. There were attempts to recruit Poles from the broader Polonia in America and Canada, but these were unsuccessful.

Furthermore, the Soviet Union had forbidden more Poles from leaving the country. This cut off the most significant part of the Polish Army in the East, “the Orthodox.” Anders instead sought to use manpower from German and Italian armies. Many ethnic Poles had been unwillingly impressed with the German Army, and there was also intelligence that suggested the possibility of Poles being used as laborers in Italy. Ultimately, the Poles got their way, and 48,000 soldiers, along with 3,000 officers and 559 Women’s Auxiliary Service volunteers, were deployed to Southern Italy.

Many Polish soldiers soon realized that the harsh conditions of the Middle East would be the easy part of their mission to liberate Poland. In 1944, the Germans took up defensive positions on the Gustav line. The line took advantage of the natural environment, consisting of mountain peaks, gorges, and caves, which provided good cover for any defending army.

Furthermore, the line was littered with machine guns, houses reinforced with concrete, barbed wire, and mines. American forces were the first to approach the Gustav Line, where they suffered heavy casualties. Successive attacks by the French and the many nationalities of the Commonwealth would fare no better.

The future battlefield that would bring fame and glory to the Polish nation was a hill with a monastery founded by Saint Benedict in 524 AD at the top. The monastery was the beginning of the Benedictine Order and, therefore, a significant location for the history and culture of Western Civilization. Saint Benedict had been sure to choose the location of the monastery with care, as armies filled with bloodlust tended to attack churches and other places of worship.

History attests to this fact: by the 11th century, the monastery had already been sacked thrice. The monastery was initially announced as, and for that matter, a neutral zone. This allowed Italian monks to care for the refugees fleeing the war inside the monastery. Allied commanders supposedly believed that the monastery was being used for military purposes by the Germans.

On February 15, 1944, American bombers bombed the complex and turned it into a ruin, killing Italian monks and refugees in the process. The event proved both a diplomatic and military error. Joesph Goebbels was quick to use the destruction of the monastery for propaganda purposes.

Furthermore, the elite German Fallschrimjager took advantage of the opportunity and quickly began to occupy and fortify the monastery. At a standstill, in the spring of 1944, the Allies prepared for Operation Diadem, a large-scale offensive to break through the Gustav line. The plan involved shelling the Gustav line while Allied units at Anzio would strike out and attempt to cut off German avenues of retreat.

This would leave the Germans with two options: being obliterated under the shadow of thousands of artillery shells or being shot by the soldiers blocking their retreat. The Poles were tasked with taking positions near the monastery. Astutely evaluating previous assaults on the monastery, General Anders decided to attack the high ground beyond the monastery, as securing this would make the German occupation of the monastery an increasingly untenable prospect.

The Kresowa Division was tasked with taking Phantom Ridge, Colle Saint Angelo, and Point 575, and the Carpathian Division was ordered to take Point 593 and Point 569. Furthermore, five Cypriot mule companies were employed to manage the logistics of such a task, which would be done in rugged terrain with the constant threat of enemy snipers and artillery.

The thundering symphony of 1600 artillery guns across the Cassino front announced the coming of the offensive. At 1:30 on May 12, the Carpathian Division charged into battle and successfully took Hill 593. While the Poles found initial success, this was not to last. The artillery barrage may have created shock and awe for the Polish and German forces, but the barrage did minor damage to German defenses. Upon the Carpathian Division approaching its second objective at Hill 569, the German 3rd Parachute Regiment launched a counterattack supported by mortar and machinegun fire from the monastery. The fighting was brutal.

Some men fought in hand-to-hand combat as they ran out of ammunition. German forces kept pushing ahead and eventually broke through. The Kresowa division’s task of taking Phantom Ridge was going no better. Like the Carpathian offensive, the Germans successfully utilized support from the monastery to launch a successful counterattack.

While the Polish offensive might have failed, other offensives succeeded because of it, and the battle was not yet over. On May 16, the Poles would begin another assault to secure strategic objectives around the monastery. This time, the 6th Lwowska Brigade of the Kresowa Division would attack Phantom Ridge, the Carpathian Division would take Albaneta and the 2nd Carpathian Division would assault Point 593.

The assault began at 22:30, and the Poles at first suffered heavy losses. However, the offensive’s momentum did not stall as it had previously. By the dawn of May 17, the Poles had captured Phantom Ridge and secured most of Colle Saint Angello. The Germans launched a ferocious counterattack that found initial success. Polish troops were, for a time, cut off from their supply lines. However, contact was eventually restored.

The 2nd Carpathian Division also conquered Point 593. The Poles considered approaching the monastery; however, they forgave such an aim upon hearing of the division’s poor performance in assaulting Albaneta.

While not all the offensives were successful, the Germans felt the stress of the Polish advances around them. The Germans decided to abandon their fortifications at the monastery under the cover of night on May 17. Most of the soldiers who retreated were either killed or captured by Polish and British patrols. The Poles learned of the retreat on May 18, and the 12th Podolski Lancers from the Carpathian Division were sent to the monastery. Upon the unit’s arrival, they found no army, only the wounded, the dead, and the ruins of the historic structure.

The Warsaw Uprising

While the achievements of the Polish military in cooperation with Western powers are hard to understate, it is also important to note how Polish-Western-Soviet relations sometimes conflicted. The lead-up to the Warsaw Uprising is a key point in this complex diplomatic situation. While the Poles wanted an independent nation-state, the Soviets wished for territorial concessions and an eastern empire, the British desired to protect Poland, but not at the expense of the Soviet alliance, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt wished to maintain his popularity with American Polonia.

Upon the collapse of the Polish state to the combined German and Soviet offensives, the Polish government in exile was formed. The Prime Minister was Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, the deputy leader of the Peasant Party, the largest political party in Poland. The Polish government-in-exile was massively popular in Poland, where an “underground state” complete with institutions such as a government, schools, and courts backed the government-in-exile.

The Home Army, an underground military organization in Poland, had 400,000 active members in mid-1944. Plans were made for a “general uprising” throughout the country during the occupation. Secret military structures were established, and partisans were trained to launch an insurgency at the most opportune time. While the light of Polish hope was dimmed when a Balkan front did not open under pressure from the Soviet Union, the Italian offensive again filled the Polish imagination with the vivid remembrance of a free Poland. Operation “Tempest” was in its first stages of becoming a reality.

Soviet interests were directly opposed to Polish interests. Stalin had already established a pro-Soviet Eastern Europe in the post-war period. Stalin told the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden a Soviet-British alliance could only exist if the British recognized the so-called “western frontier” of the Soviet Union consisting of eastern Poland, parts of Finland, the Baltic States, Romanian Bessarabia, and northern Bukovina. Further, Stalin suggested a willingness to “negotiate” with Poland if the “Curzon Line” was recognized as the legitimate border between the two states. Stalin also proposed Poland be “compensated” for the territorial losses by having the victorious Allied powers grant eastern German territory to Poland.

The Polish population was opposed to any concessions along its eastern border. The Poles believed that such territory was necessary to save Poland from foreign aggression, just as the eastern territories had done so during the Polish-Soviet War.

Stalin’s manipulation of Poland did not just exist in the field of land but also the realm of politics. Between 1936 and 1938, Stalin ordered the murder of a Polish Communist in Moscow who was part of the Polish Communist Party along with the party’s dissolution. The party was to be replaced by the Soviet-established Polish Workers’ Party (PPR).

Furthermore, Stalin created a Communist-led Polish army in 1943. Berling’s army was one such Polish force created by the Soviets. Its men took the following oath: “I solemnly swear to the Polish soil, dark with blood, to the Polish nation, tortured under German oppression, that I shall be worthy of the Polish name, and that I shall faithfully serve my Fatherland.” The omission of God and the Polish Republic symbolizes the Soviet view of the Polish state, her people, and her values.

Stalin also founded the Committee of National Liberation (PKWN) to challenge the Polish government in exile. In December 1944, the PKWN declared itself the Provisional government of Poland. Moscow unsurprisingly backed such a move.

The British and American governments had differing attitudes to the Polish question. The British government wanted to maintain the British-Soviet alliance it had established in 1942. However, it also sought to do this without dispelling public opinion, as the British public demanded a fair deal for Poland.

In 1942, this dissonance between the government and its people came to a head when the House of Commons reacted in astonishment and horror at the audacity of Soviet territorial demands. Only Roosevelt approaching Stalin and convincing him to concede on some of his demands at the moment could save a British-Soviet alliance.

Roosevelt’s actions in this scenario reflected American policy towards Poland. Roosevelt had no objections to Soviet demands; however, Polish Americans were large supporters of the New Deal, and Roosevelt needed their support to win the 1944 election.

The Great Powers of the Allies came together at Tehran to discuss a post-war Europe. Churchill proposed that the Soviets receive Eastern Poland and that Poland acquire territory in Germany to its north and west. Stalin enthusiastically agreed. Roosevelt agreed as well, but he wished to keep his agreement with the policy a secret as he needed Polish support in the election, a fact he made known to Stalin at the time. When Mikolajczyk sought to establish a “demarcation line,” the Soviets rejected it, leading to Polish fears of the status of a post-war Poland.

There was further concern when Soviet media pushed for the so-called “reconstruction” of the Polish “government-in-exile.” Such a policy would have meant the elimination of “fascist” members of the Polish government.

On July 4, in light of massive Soviet gains, Mikolajczyk radioed both Jan S. Jankowski, a government delegate, and Tadeusz Bor-Komorowski, the Commander of the AK, saying the AK and underground state authorities must meet the Soviets upon their arrival and pronounce the authority of the legitimate government of Poland. Especially concerning was the fact that the Soviet general Berling was to call for an uprising while the Soviets organized local administrators in the country.

Mikolajczyk suggested the possibility of a partial rebellion against the Germans to achieve such a task. He also discussed the possibility of the government-in-exile moving from London to Warsaw. Mikolajczyk did not give up hope on negotiations with the Soviets, but his plans ultimately did not come to fruition.

On August 1, the AK began their uprising. Shots rang out around Warsaw as the AK’s 45,000-man strong force emerged from hiding and attacked Nazi installations in Warsaw. The decision to begin the uprising appears to have been made by unconfirmed reports of Soviet tanks near Praga, an eastern suburb of Warsaw. Soviet guns had been heard for several days, and the Soviets had secured the town of Radzymin.

When making the decision, the AK commanders were unaware that several German armored divisions had arrived on the front and would push back the Rokossovsky First Belorussian Front. This information does make the uprising appear untimely. However, such information would have only delayed the uprising for 1 or 2 days.

Furthermore, defeated German troops had been retreating through the city. On July 27, the German governor, Ludwig Fisher, ordered 100,000 Polish men to build fortifications around Warsaw. Mikolajczyk arrived in Moscow on July 30 and requested Soviet planes bomb German airfields and railway junctions.

In Warsaw, the structures of the underground state revealed themselves in the capital city. However, not everyone was thrilled to see Poland flags in the streets of Warsaw once again. Stalin was upset about the uprising, which spoiled his plans of creating a Soviet-dominated Poland. The Soviets immediately stopped their advance to Warsaw upon hearing about the Polish insurgency.

The Soviets also ended artillery barrages and aerial bombardments against the city. The Americans were denied access to Soviet-controlled airfields, preventing them from assisting the insurgents. Therefore, only the Royal Air Force could assist, and its assistance was limited.

The citizen soldiers of the AK had no heavy weapons, and only 10% of the soldiers had a weapon on hand at the time of the revolt. Nonetheless, the citizen army of the AK managed to resist German attempts to retake the city for 63 days. The fighting was brutal. Polish units fought in their homes, shops, and streets with SS soldiers using both captured and homemade weapons.

German Nazi forces committed mass murder throughout the campaign, including areas outside the battle zone. The German Nazi government used units made up of those serving prison sentences. These penal units acted with such malice that even the cruelest SS officers were appalled.

The Poles led a staunch resistance against the German units. For example, on August 20, insurgent forces made up of units of teenage girls attacked the State Telephone Exchange Building. The insurgents forced the Germans upwards by detonating explosives on the lower floors of the building. Then, being equipped with flamethrowers, the insurgents set the building alight.

This left the Germans inside with three options: surrender, fight their way down and be killed, or suicide. Despite the tenacity of the uprising, the Poles found themselves in a shrinking perimeter due to the amount of resources the Germans had thrown at them and the lack of Allied support.

The insurgents finally surrendered on October 2, when it was agreed that the AK troops would be treated as uniformed combatants under the Geneva Convention. The Germans had killed 200,000 Polish civilians in their quest to stamp out the Polish nation. Hitler ordered the destruction of the city after the uprising. 85% of the city’s buildings were demolished. Buildings of cultural and historical significance were destroyed.

Compare and Contrast

The Battle of Monte Cassino and the Battle of Warsaw were both brutal and contained a dreaded loss of life of both the Poles and their enemies. Poles in both battles had fought for the defense of their homeland against unjust aggression from the fanatical tyrannies of German Nazism and Russian Stalinism.

Overall, the battles have similarities but also notable differences. First, the main similarity of the battles was that both were a result of the Polish desire for independence based on the fundamental principles of Polish society. Both were the result of Polish actors who either coordinated with their Western allies or brought the fight to the Germans and Soviets on their own agency. However, the battles overall are more different than they are similar.

First, and perhaps most obviously, two conventional military forces fought the Battle for Monte Cassino, while Polish civilians fought the Battle of Warsaw.

Second, the Battle of Monte Cassino was fought with the cooperation of Allied forces. At the same time, the Battle of Warsaw was conducted essentially alone either because of an inability to help the Poles, as is mostly the case of the Western Allies, or deliberate hostility to their interest, as is the case of the Soviet Union.

Finally, while the Battle of Monte Cassino made international headlines and was well recorded, the Warsaw uprising was seldom heard outside Poland.

First, what is similar about the two battles is that both the Battle of Monte Cassino and the Battle of Warsaw were, for the Poles, a battle for Poland’s political and cultural freedom. On March 11, 1944, General Anders issued the following order to the 2nd Polish Corps:

“Soldiers – we march ahead with the holy motto of God, Honor, Homeland in our hearts, remembering Germany’s bandit attack against Poland, the German-Soviet partitions of Poland, the thousands of ruined towns and cities, the murders and tortures inflicted on hundreds of thousands of our brothers and sisters, the millions of Poles deported to Germany as slaves, the plight and sorrow of our country, the suffering and exile, with the faith in the justice of Divine Providence.”

Anders’s command sums up the desires of the young and hopeful Polish soldier and the old and wise Polish officer. The Poles fought not just for a vague, ambiguous, and ultimately meaningless freedom of their country but for a meaningful freedom that had certain values attached to it—a freedom that recognized the dignity of human life, the traditions of the Polish people, and the authority of God. This was what the motto “God, Honor, Homeland” meant to the Polish soldier.

The Battle of Warsaw was similarly a fight for Poland’s political and cultural freedom. It was primarily the result of Operation Tempest, a plan the Polish Underground State devised to bring freedom and liberty to Poland. The battle was again for the specific type of freedom mentioned previously.

If the Poles had not rebelled, it is likely the Soviets would have marched through Warsaw and “freed” the Poles from the tyranny of Nazism. This would only have replaced one tyranny with another. Therefore, the Battle of Warsaw was just as much about the German Nazi oppressors of Poland as it was about the Soviet ones.

Both battles were not simply fought for a hatred of the oppressed Polish people but for their love of what they sought to defend. Ultimately, the Poles wished to maintain their free society by maintaining their Catholic and Polish identity.

As mentioned before, the battles were more different than they were alike. First, the Battle of Monte Cassino was fought using conventional armies, while the Battle of Warsaw was fought with an unconventional civilian force. The Battle of Monte Cassino, being fought with a conventional force, was ultimately successful. The troops were trained and, at this point, had some combat experience.

Overall, the Poles, as far as one can tell in war, knew what to expect. They had a well-thought-out plan to achieve their military objectives and utilized their units accordingly in the specific task they were specialized for. This differs from the Warsaw uprising.

While the Poles performed a heroic defense, they were outmatched by the relatively more organized German military structure. Even though the Poles in the Warsaw Uprising did face off against German units made up of criminals taken from penal institutions, the Poles still had to face a German army with experienced commanders, better weapons, and an efficient system of logistics. This put the Polish militias at a significant disadvantage compared to the German forces, making it all the more remarkable that they could hold out for so long.

Secondly, the Battle of Monte Cassino and the Battle of Warsaw were different as the Battle of Monte Cassino was fought alongside the Western Allies, while the Poles in the Battle of Warsaw ultimately fought alone. The Battle of Monte Cassino was a part of the large Allied offensive to liberate Fascist-occupied Europe by attacking the “soft underbelly” of Hitler. Ultimately, Allied Leaders hoped an Italian offensive would prove pivotal to the war effort by both putting pressure on Berlin and forcing the Nazi machine to invest resources in defending its Italian ally.

The Poles played a small but essential role in the Italian campaign. The Battle of Warsaw, on the other hand, was different. The Western allies were largely unable to help Poland during the Warsaw Uprising. The British Airforce did attempt to drop supplies to the insurgents fighting for their lives in the city, but it was never going to be possible to supply the vast logistical needs of the AK with simple airdrops. If the Warsaw uprising were to succeed, it would need Soviet support. Such an outcome was unlikely to come.

The Soviets and Poles had fought an initial war in 1920, and westward expansion was the long-term goal of both the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire before it. Upon hearing of the rebellion, the Soviets halted on the eastern side of the Vistula. While the Soviets blamed logistical problems for the military slowdown, the rapid advance of Soviet forces in the previous two months, Moscow’s support of the PKWN, and the historical hostility Moscow showed the Polish state suggest otherwise.

Finally, the battles were also different because the Battle of Monte Cassino was well documented in international headlines and historical sources, while the Warsaw Uprising was less so. The Battle of Monte Cassino was fought over a monastery, and Allied commanders made several assaults and failed. This did not stop Polish bravery from being put on display.

Upon capturing the monastery, the battle made international headlines, even if the fame was short-lived because of the Liberation of Rome and the Normandy landings. Furthermore, the Polish forces showed their solidarity with the Allies against Nazism. The Battle of Cassino is well-documented, brought the 2nd Polish Corps fame, and a Polish military cemetery was made to honor the Polish servicemen who lost their lives at the location.

However, outside of Poland, the Warsaw Uprising is far less known. When Poland became a puppet state of the Soviet Union, Communist authorities systematically purged the non-communist elements of the underground state. Communist historiography referred to the Home Army as a “fascist” system that collaborated with the Nazi government. Although after 1956, this historiography was somewhat moderated, official monuments and commemorations of the uprising were prohibited, and the actions Soviet forces took, or to say it better, did not take, could not be mentioned.

In the West, the story of the uprising is usually unknown. It is usually confused with the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising in 1943 in which Jews who suffered inhumane conditions in the ghetto fought against the Germans. Furthermore, the Warsaw uprising contradicted Western historiography of World War II. Western historiography usually did not focus on the Warsaw Uprising.

In the popular imagination of many in the West, the Soviet Union is portrayed as a heroic ally against Nazism, downplaying events and actions by Soviet forces and their communist allies, such as the Soviet role in starting the conflict through the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

Unfortunately, distortions of history have led to the Uprising being thrown into the dustbin of history outside Poland.

Conclusion

Poland was put in a difficult position at the beginning of World War II. If the Western Allies had acted on their promises and engaged in an immediate offensive against Germany, the war would likely have been over fairly quickly.

German commanders, with good reason, were always fearful about fighting a two-front war. To analyze what could have been different to safeguard the Polish state, it is helpful to relate the situation in which it found itself in the 1930s to that of the competing powers in the First World War. The German-Russian alliance established by Bismarck was a key feature of German foreign policy until 1890. When this alliance faded, France attempted to establish a Franco-Russian alliance. Wilhelm II desperately tried to prevent this alliance. However, this proved fruitless, and France and Russia signed a treaty in 1894.

Initially, the Germans devised a plan to strike east first; however, such ideas were scrapped in favor of the Von Schlieffen Plan if a French army managed to take Alsace, there was little to prevent it from moving North along the Rhine with limited divisions on the western front.

The French could have pushed into Germany, causing a military crisis for the German high command. The Germans would have two choices: either maintain their current strategy and risk the Western front completely collapsing and becoming unrecoverable or move troops to the Western front.

The latter option would have slowed down a German offensive in Poland if not prevented the total capitulation of the Polish state. Another way Poland might have been saved would have been through a conditional peace treaty with the Empire of Japan. While many historical works detail the German military fears of fighting a two-front war, fewer works go into detail about the Soviet fear of such a scenario.

In the buildup to World War II, the Soviet Union risked fighting a war on its western front against Germany and in the Far East against Japan. When hostilities broke out with Nazi Germany, Stalin demanded its forces in the Far East to avoid actions that may begin a conflict with Japan. In fact, Stalin kept troops in the Far East, rather than sending them to fight the Germans in Eastern Europe, until he received intelligence that the Japanese Empire was not planning an attack on the Soviet Union.

When discussing Soviet action against Japan with the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, Stalin said that while the Soviets were fighting the Germans, they could not wage a war on two fronts.

Furthermore, when Stalin promised to declare war against Japan at the Tehran Conference, this was only on the condition of German capitulation. To summarize, the Soviet Union was just as fearful of a militaristic Japan as of a militaristic Germany.

This presents an interesting dilemma for Western foreign policy regarding the Soviet Union. The Western Allies, led by the United States, pursued a policy of unconditional surrender supported by Truman and the American public. The successful testing of an atomic bomb only strengthened the appeal of such a foreign policy. However, the unconditional surrender policy did not go without objection.

For example, Henry Stimson, the secretary of war, and Joseph Grew, the navy secretary, called for the Potsdam terms to be altered to allow Japan to keep its monarchical government and current dynasty. This, they argued, would have the Japanese Emperor turn to more moderate elements in his government, which would have encouraged an early surrender. Therefore, it is potentially possible that a more conditional peace treaty could have maintained a highly militaristic, but strategically moderated Japan. Such a Japanese Empire could prove helpful in negotiations over Eastern Europe.

Suppose the Soviet Union was concerned about its security in the Far East. In that case, the Western Allies might have been able to demand the freedom of Central and Eastern European countries in exchange for Soviet demands in East Asia.

Overall, The Battle of Monte Cassino and the Battle of Warsaw were both contributions made by the Polish people in achieving a Europe free of Nazi and Bolshevik tyranny. Both battles were fought by Poles who sought to achieve what had been denied to their ancestors for so long: an independent state that respected and promoted the common good of the Polish people and their values.

Despite their valiant defense, the Poles were outmatched by their German and Soviet enemies and received little help from their Western Allies. It is a shame that so many of today’s youth have neglected history. History affects everything one does in the present moment.

History is the reason one is where they are. In the past, people would have built upon the traditions of their forefathers. However, in contemporary times, people worldwide find their histories under attack. These ideologies, which seek to “deconstruct” people’s identities and values, do not exist to bring people together but to tear them apart and leave nothing but an individual with no ties or obligations to any other component of society.

History is the most significant secular unifier. This is why history is so important to protect and cherish. History and tradition not only shape national identity but are, in many ways, the essence of national identity, without which such national identities could not be said to exist.

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  1. John Mosier, “France and the Failures of National Defense, 1870-1914” The Myth of the Great War: How the Germans Won the Battles and How the Americans Saved the Allies, (HarperCollins Publishers, 2002), 17.

 

  1. John Mosier, “Germany and the Development of Combined Arms Tactics” The Myth of the Great War: How the Germans Won the Battles and How the Americans Saved the Allies, (HarperCollins Publishers, 2002), 35-36.

 

  1. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, “Soviet Policy Toward Japan During World War II,” Cahiers du Monde Russe, Vol 52, No. 2/3 (April 2011): 246-247, 254. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41708322

 

  1. Mirosław Szumiło, “Battle of Warsaw, 1920,” Institute of National Remembrance August 15, 2024. https://eng.ipn.gov.pl/en/digital-resources/articles/4397,Battle-of-Warsaw-1920.html

 

  1. “IPNtv: The Unconquered” by IPNtvPL (2017), 0:27 and 2:34.

 

 

  1. Maciej Korkuć, The Fighting Republic of Poland: 1939-1945, (Warsaw, Publishing House of IPN, 2019), 16-19, 25-30. https://eng.ipn.gov.pl/en/news/3273,quotThe-Fighting-Republic-of-Poland-1939-1945quot-a-popular-publication-for-youn.html

 

  1. “September 1939,” Institute of National Remembrance, August 10, 2024, https://1september39.com/

 

  1. Richard C. Lukas, “Russia, The Warsaw Uprising and the Cold War,” The Polish Review, Vol. 20, No. 4 (1975): 13-15, 17, 23. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25777302

 

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